30 research outputs found
LNCS
Generalized Selective Decryption (GSD), introduced by Panjwani [TCCâ07], is a game for a symmetric encryption scheme Enc that captures the difficulty of proving adaptive security of certain protocols, most notably the Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) multicast encryption protocol. In the GSD game there are n keys k1,..., kn, which the adversary may adaptively corrupt (learn); moreover, it can ask for encryptions Encki (kj) of keys under other keys. The adversaryâs task is to distinguish keys (which it cannot trivially compute) from random. Proving the hardness of GSD assuming only IND-CPA security of Enc is surprisingly hard. Using âcomplexity leveragingâ loses a factor exponential in n, which makes the proof practically meaningless. We can think of the GSD game as building a graph on n vertices, where we add an edge i â j when the adversary asks for an encryption of kj under ki. If restricted to graphs of depth â, Panjwani gave a reduction that loses only a factor exponential in â (not n). To date, this is the only non-trivial result known for GSD. In this paper we give almost-polynomial reductions for large classes of graphs. Most importantly, we prove the security of the GSD game restricted to trees losing only a quasi-polynomial factor n3 log n+5. Trees are an important special case capturing real-world protocols like the LKH protocol. Our new bound improves upon Panjwaniâs on some LKH variants proposed in the literature where the underlying tree is not balanced. Our proof builds on ideas from the ânested hybridsâ technique recently introduced by Fuchsbauer et al. [Asiacryptâ14] for proving the adaptive security of constrained PRFs
Adaptively Secure Garbling Schemes for Parallel Computations
We construct the first adaptively secure garbling scheme based on standard public-key assumptions for garbling a circuit that simultaneously achieves a near-optimal online complexity (where is the security parameter) and \emph{preserves the parallel efficiency} for evaluating the garbled circuit; namely, if the depth of is , then the garbled circuit can be evaluated in parallel time . In particular, our construction improves over the recent seminal work of Garg et al. (Eurocrypt 2018), which constructs the first adaptively secure garbling scheme with a near-optimal online complexity under the same assumptions, but the garbled circuit can only be evaluated gate by gate in a sequential manner. Our construction combines their novel idea of linearization with several new ideas to achieve parallel efficiency without compromising online complexity.
We take one step further to construct the first adaptively secure garbling scheme for parallel RAM (PRAM) programs under standard assumptions that preserves the parallel efficiency. Previous such constructions we are aware of is from strong assumptions like indistinguishability obfuscation. Our construction is based on the work of Garg et al. (Crypto 2018) for adaptively secure garbled RAM, but again introduces several new ideas to handle parallel RAM computation, which may be of independent interests. As an application, this yields the first constant round secure computation protocol for persistent PRAM programs in the malicious settings from standard assumptions
Exact Weight Subgraphs and the k-Sum Conjecture
We consider the Exact-Weight-H problem of finding a (not necessarily induced)
subgraph H of weight 0 in an edge-weighted graph G. We show that for every H,
the complexity of this problem is strongly related to that of the infamous
k-Sum problem. In particular, we show that under the k-Sum Conjecture, we can
achieve tight upper and lower bounds for the Exact-Weight-H problem for various
subgraphs H such as matching, star, path, and cycle. One interesting
consequence is that improving on the O(n^3) upper bound for Exact-Weight-4-Path
or Exact-Weight-5-Path will imply improved algorithms for 3-Sum, 5-Sum,
All-Pairs Shortest Paths and other fundamental problems. This is in sharp
contrast to the minimum-weight and (unweighted) detection versions, which can
be solved easily in time O(n^2). We also show that a faster algorithm for any
of the following three problems would yield faster algorithms for the others:
3-Sum, Exact-Weight-3-Matching, and Exact-Weight-3-Star
Security Analysis and Improvements for the IETF MLS Standard for Group Messaging
Secure messaging (SM) protocols allow users to communicate securely
over untrusted infrastructure. In contrast to most other secure
communication protocols (such as TLS, SSH, or Wireguard), SM
sessions may be long-lived (e.g., years) and highly asynchronous.
In order to deal with likely state compromises of users during the
lifetime of a session, SM protocols do not only protect authenticity
and privacy, but they also guarantee forward secrecy (FS) and
post-compromise security (PCS). The former ensures that
messages sent and received before a state compromise remain secure,
while the latter ensures that users can recover from state
compromise as a consequence of normal protocol usage.
SM has received considerable attention in the two-party
case, where prior work has studied the well-known double-ratchet
paradigm in particular and SM as a cryptographic primitive in
general. Unfortunately, this paradigm does not scale well to the
problem of secure group messaging (SGM). In order to address
the lack of satisfactory SGM protocols, the IETF has launched the
message-layer security (MLS) working group, which aims to
standardize an eponymous SGM protocol.
In this work we analyze the TreeKEM protocol, which is at the
core of the SGM protocol proposed by the MLS working group.
On a positive note, we show that TreeKEM achieves PCS in isolation
(and slightly more). However, we observe that the current version
of TreeKEM does not provide an adequate form of FS. More precisely,
our work proceeds by formally capturing the exact security of
TreeKEM as a so-called continuous group key agreement (CGKA)
protocol, which we believe to be a primitive of independent
interest. To address the insecurity of TreeKEM, we propose a simple
modification to TreeKEM inspired by recent work of Jost et al.
(EUROCRYPT \u2719) and an idea due to Kohbrok (MLS Mailing List). We
then show that the modified version of TreeKEM comes with almost no
efficiency degradation but achieves optimal (according to MLS
specification) CGKA security, including FS and PCS. Our work also
lays out how a CGKA protocol can be used to design a full SGM
protocol.
Finally, we propose and motivate an extensive list of
potential future research directions for the area
Adaptively Secure Garbling with Near Optimal Online Complexity
We construct an adaptively secure garbling scheme with an online communication complexity of
where is the circuit being garbled,
and is the security parameter. The security of our scheme can be based on (polynomial hardness of) the
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, or the Factoring assumption or the Learning with Errors assumption.
This is nearly the best achievable in the standard model (i.e., without random oracles)
as the online communication complexity must be larger than both and . The online computational
complexity of our scheme is .
Previously known standard model adaptively secure garbling schemes had asymptotically worse
online cost or relied on exponentially hard computational assumptions
Adaptively Indistinguishable Garbled Circuits
A garbling scheme is used to garble a circuit and an input in a way that reveals the output but hides everything else. An adaptively secure scheme allows the adversary to specify the input after seeing the garbled circuit. Applebaum et al. (CRYPTO \u2713) showed that in any garbling scheme with adaptive simulation-based security, the size of the garbled input must exceed the output size of the circuit. Here we show how to circumvent this lower bound and achieve significantly better efficiency under the minimal assumption that one-way functions exist by relaxing the security notion from simulation-based to indistinguishability-based.
We rely on the recent work of Hemenway et al. (CRYPTO \u2716) which constructed an adaptive simulation-based garbling scheme under one-way functions. The size of the garbled input in their scheme is as large as the output size of the circuit plus a certain pebble complexity of the circuit, where the latter is (e.g.,) bounded by the space complexity of the computation. By building on top of their construction and adapting their proof technique, we show how to remove the output size dependence in their result when considering indistinguishability-based security.
As an application of the above result, we get a symmetric-key functional encryption based on one-way functions, with indistinguishability-based security where the adversary can obtain an unbounded number of function secret keys and then adaptively a single challenge ciphertext. The size of the ciphertext only depends on the maximal pebble complexity of each of the functions but not on the number of functions or their circuit size
Four-state Non-malleable Codes with Explicit Constant Rate
Non-malleable codes (NMCs), introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs (ITCS 2010), generalize the classical notion of error correcting codes by providing a powerful guarantee even in scenarios where error correcting codes cannot provide any guarantee: a decoded message is either the same or completely independent of the underlying message, regardless of the number of errors introduced into the codeword. Informally, NMCs are defined with respect to a family of tampering functions and guarantee that any tampered codeword either decodes to the same message or to an independent message, so long as it is tampered using a function .
Nearly all known constructions of NMCs are for the -split-state family, where the adversary tampers each of the blocks (also known as states), of a codeword, arbitrarily but independently. Cheraghchi and Guruswami (TCC 2014) obtain a Rate-1 non-malleable code for the case where with being the codeword length and, in (ITCS 2014), show an upper bound of on the best achievable rate for any split state NMC. For , Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman (FOCS 2014) achieve a constant rate construction where the constant is unknown. In summary, there is no known construction
of an NMC with an explicit constant rate for any , let alone one that comes close to matching Cheraghchi and Guruswami\u27s lowerbound!
In this work, we construct an efficient non-malleable code in the -split-state model, for , that achieves a constant rate of , for any constant , and error , where is the length of the message and is a constant
Adaptive Security of Practical Garbling Schemes
A garbling scheme enables one to garble a circuit C and an input x in a way that C(x) can be evaluated, but nothing else is revealed. Since the first construction by Yao, there have been tremendous practical efficiency improvements for selectively secure garbling schemes, where the adversary is forced to choose both input and circuit to be garbled at the same time. However, in the more realistic setting of adaptive security --where an adversary can choose the input adaptively based on the garbled circuit-- not much is known about practical efficiency improvements.
In this work, we initiate the study of practical garbling schemes that are both more efficient than Yao\u27s construction and adaptively secure. We provide insights into characteristics of these schemes and highlight the limitations of current techniques for proving adaptive security in this regime. Furthermore, we present an adaptively secure garbling scheme that garbles XOR gates with 2 and AND gates with 3 ciphertexts per gate, thus providing the first practical garbling scheme with adaptive security based on PRFs whose garbled circuit size is smaller than that of Yao\u27s construction
Non-malleable Randomness Encoders and their Applications
Non-malleable Codes (NMCs), introduced by Dziembowski, Peitrzak and Wichs (ITCS 2010), serve the purpose of preventing related tampering of encoded messages. The most popular tampering model considered is the -split-state model where a codeword consists of 2 states, each of which can be tampered independently. While NMCs in the -split state model provide the strongest security guarantee, despite much research in the area we only know how to build them with poor rate (, where is the codeword length). However, in many applications of NMCs one only needs to be able to encode randomness i.e., security is not required to hold for arbitrary, adversarially chosen messages. For example, in applications of NMCs to tamper-resilient security, the messages that are encoded are typically randomly generated secret keys. To exploit this, in this work, we introduce the notion of Non-malleable Randomness Encoders (NMREs) as a relaxation of NMCs in the following sense: NMREs output a random message along with its corresponding non-malleable encoding.
Our main result is the construction of a -split state, rate- NMRE. While NMREs are interesting in their own right and can be directly used in applications such as in the construction of tamper-resilient cryptographic primitives, we also show how to use them, in a black-box manner, to build a -split-state (standard) NMCs with rate . This improves both the number of states, as well as the rate, of existing constant-rate NMCs
Non-malleable codes for space-bounded tampering
Non-malleable codesâintroduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs at ICS 2010âare key-less coding schemes in which mauling attempts to an encoding of a given message, w.r.t. some class of tampering adversaries, result in a decoded value that is either identical or unrelated to the original message. Such codes are very useful for protecting arbitrary cryptographic primitives against tampering attacks against the memory. Clearly, non-malleability is hopeless if the class of tampering adversaries includes the decoding and encoding algorithm. To circumvent this obstacle, the majority of past research focused on designing non-malleable codes for various tampering classes, albeit assuming that the adversary is unable to decode. Nonetheless, in many concrete settings, this assumption is not realistic